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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent ] 
vs. ] 
KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS, ] 
Defendant/Appellant ] 
) Case No. 
i Priority No. 13 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether p r o p e r t y acquired by Scott 
during m a r r i a g e t h r o u g h a buy-sell agreement is 
property of Scott H. Phillips or marital property? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Opinion of the Court of A p p e a l s ( h e r e i n a f t e r 
referred to as "the Opinion1') is set forth in its entirety in the 
Appendix to this brief. 
H. P h i l l i p s 
the separate 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction to grant or 
deny a petition for writ of certiorari for review of a Court of 
Appeals adjudication p u r s u a n t to S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 5 ) Utah Code 
A n n o t a t e d , as a m e n d e d . Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Utah 
Supreme Court, review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when 
there are special and important reasons therefor. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
S e c t i o n 3 0 - 3 - 5 ( 1 ) Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , as a m e n d e d 
( 1 9 8 5 ) , Disposition of Property 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the Court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the case. This is an action for divorce 
o r i g i n a l l y tried b e f o r e J u d g e David E. Roth in t h e S e c o n d 
Judicial District Court of Weber County. Appellant, Kathryn A. 
Phillips, appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals c o n t e s t i n g the 
property division and alimony award rendered by the trial court. 
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The property award was partially reversed in a decision entered 
by the Utah Court of Appeals on April 3, 1989, and the issue of 
alimony was remanded to the trial court for additional findings 
of fact. Respondent's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
challenges only the property division as modified by the Court of 
Appeals . 
2 . Disposition at Trial Court, 
divided the assets of the parties as follows: 
Plaintiff, Scott H. Phillips: 
a. Civil Service Retirement, free of 
any claim by defendant 
b. Furniture, sporting goods, and 
personal property 
c. 1986 Volkswagon 
d. Ketchum, Idaho bank account 
e. Hoback Junction, Idaho cabin 
f. IRA account 
g. Phillips Investment Trust 
TOTAL 
Defendant, Kathryn A. Phillips: 
a. Riverdale, Utah home subject to 
mortgage of $47,000.00 
b. Furniture and furnishings 
c. 1981 Honda motor vehicle 
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The trial court 
$ 29,000.00 
1,000.00 
6,800.00 
300.00 
45,000.00 
11,952.00 
263,650.00 
$357,702.00 
$ 29,000.00 
6,500.00 
2,000.00 
d. IRA account 
e. Weber Valley account 
f. Victor Estate Lot 
g. Moore Financial stock 
2,576.00 
1,600,00 
4,500.00 
648.00 
TOTAL $46,824.00 
In the Decree of Divorce, plaintiff, Scott H. Phillips 
was ordered to pay defendant, Kathryn A. Phillips an additional 
$ 2 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 cash to e q u a l i z e the p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . The 
trial court made a Finding of Fact, together with a Conclusion of 
Law, that assets of Phillips Investment were p l a i n t i f f ' s sole 
and separate property and defendant had no claim to it. 
3. D i s p o s i t i o n at Court of A p p e a l s . The Court of 
A p p e a l s r e v e r s e d , in p a r t , f i n d i n g t h e s t o c k a c q u i r e d by 
p l a i n t i f f in 1984 pursuant to a buy-sell agreement was marital 
property and not the sole and separate p r o p e r t y of p l a i n t i f f . 
Defendant was awarded one-half the value of the stock purchased 
with funds from an insurance policy required under the terms of 
the buy-sell agreement. The Court of Appeals concluded plaintiff 
did not a c q u i r e his b r o t h e r ' s h a l f i n t e r e s t of P h i l l i p s 
Investment prior to the marriage and thus it was not premarital 
property. Since the stock was purchased, it was not inherited 
nor gifted property. Therefore, the Court determined the stock 
was marital property because it was purchased during the marriage 
- 4 -
of the p a r t i e s . This d e t e r m i n a t i o n results in an additional 
award of $70,000.00 to defendant, Kathryn A. Phillips. 
4. R e l e v e n t Fac ts . P l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t were 
m a r r i e d on O c t o b e r 6, 1967 in A l t a , U t a h . (Tr at 110) The 
parties had been married twenty (20) years at the time of the 
divorce trial. Both parties were 45 years of age. (Tr. at 110, 
111) Two children were born to the marriage, Michael, age 19, 
and Christopher, age 16. (Tr. at 56) Defendant was unemployed 
at the time of trial and had been a h o u s e w i f e and h o m e m a k e r 
almost exclusively throughout the marriage. (Tr. at 111, 112) 
Defendant had one (1) year of college in Minnesota and eighteen 
months of medical technology training, all prior to the marriage. 
(Tr. at 111) 
T h e p r i m a r y c o n t e s t b e t w e e n the p a r t i e s c e n t e r e d 
a r o u n d d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e a s s e t s k n o w n as t h e P h i l l i p s 
I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t . ( P l a i n t i f f s E x h i b i t 14) The trust was 
established by plaintiff, Scott H. Phillip's mother and father. 
Plaintiff's mother and father, Francis M. Phillips and 
Hugh V. Phillips, started a funeral home b u s i n e s s in Idaho in 
1937. (Tr. at 11) Frances and Hugh Phillips had two children, 
Scott, the plaintiff, and Mark, who drowned in 1984. (Tr. at 12) 
T h e funeral b u s i n e s s , known as White M o r t u a r y was 
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i n c o r p o r a t e d in 1 9 6 6 for tax p u r p o s e s and b e c a m e P h i l l i p s 
I n v e s t m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n . (Tr. at 1 3 , 14) P l a i n t i f f , Scott 
Phillips, received one share of stock at that time. (Tr. at 13) 
A d m i t t e d l y , p l a i n t i f f w a s ney er i n v o l v e d in t h e m o r t u a r y 
b u s i n e s s . {Tr. at 14) P l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t , Kathryn A. 
Phillips, were married on October 6, 1967. (Tr. at 11) 
Dividends on Phillips Investment Corporation stock were 
regularly paid to stockholders from 1970 to 1977. (Tr. at 16) 
In 1 9 7 9 , the mortuary business was sold to Ronald Hamilton and 
Jerry H o l m a n , e m p l o y e e s of the funeral h o m e . ( T r . at 17) 
Hamilton and Holman executed a Promissory Note to pay the balance 
of the purchase price on the mortuary business. (Tr. at 17) The 
primary asset of Phillips Investment Corporation became the right 
to receive the proceeds from the Hamilton-Holman Promissory Note. 
(Tr. at 18) At the time of the trial, the amount still owed to 
the corporation by Hami lton-Holman was $112,500.00. (Tr. at 27) 
In 1 9 8 2 , p l a i n t i f f and his b r o t h e r , M a r k , signed a 
promissory note for $ 1 4 5 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 p a y a b l e to their p a r e n t s and 
acquired the assets of the Phillips Investment Corporation, which 
included the right to receive payments from the Hami lton-Holman 
Promissory Note. (Tr. at 19) Plaintiff and brother, Mark, paid 
pursuant to the terms of their promissory note, annual payments 
of approximately thirty five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) to Mr. 
& Mrs. Hugh Phillips. (Tr. at 19) At the time of the trial, the 
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amount due Mr. & Mrs. Phillips was $75,773.00. (Tr. at 27) 
In 1983, plaintiff and his brother, Mark, converted the 
corporation to a partnership for tax purposes. (Tr. at 20) Mark 
P h i l l i p s died in a kayak a c c i d e n t in 1 9 8 4 and p l a i n t i f f 
p u r c h a s e d Mark Phillip's half interest in Phillips Investment. 
(Tr. at 20) P l a i n t i f f p u r c h a s e d all the a s s e t s of the 
p a r t n e r s h i p from M a r k ' s w i d o w with insurance from a buy-sell 
agreement. (Tr. at 32) 
P l a i n t i f f and his brother, Mark, had executed a buy-
sell agreement in January, 1980 and maintained insurance to fund 
p u r c h a s e of the o t h e r ' s interest in the event either of them 
died. (Tr. at 32) Mark Phillips died in an unfortunate drowning 
accident in 1984 and his widow received $218,000.00 in insurance 
p r o c e e d s and p l a i n t i f f acquired total interest in P h i l l i p s 
Investment partnership. (Tr. at 32, 33) This property was not a 
gift nor inheritance as buy-sell insurance funded payment to Mark 
Phillip's widow for her husband's interest in the partnership. 
Phillips Investment made a profit from real p r o p e r t y 
in which Scott and Kathryn P h i l l i p s resided w h i l e living in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Scott and Kathy Phillips rented a home 
from Phillips Investment Company from 1970 to 1979. (Tr. at 30) 
The home was sold by Phillips I n v e s t m e n t Company in 1979 for 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 8 9 , 0 0 . 0 0 and the p r o c e e d s were retained by 
Phillips Investment. (Tr. at 31) There was a profit of 
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$55,000.00 made on the sale of the home. (Tr. at 48) 
Scott and K a t h r y n P h i l l i p s were t r a n s f e r r e d by the 
F o r e s t S e r v i c e to P l e a s a n t G r o v e , Utah in 1979 and received 
$12,000.00 from a "slush fund" of Phillips Investment Company to 
pay toward down payment of a home in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Tr. 
at 29) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing, in 
part, the decision of the trial court followed the law set forth 
i n M o r t e n s e n v. M o r t e n s e n , 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) . The 
O p i n i o n cites Mortensen, supra, as authority on the subject of 
dividing property acquired during marriage and distinguishes why 
some of the assets of Phillips Investment are marital instead of 
separate property. The Opinion clarified that plaintiff's first 
50% interest in Phillips Investment was obtained from his parents 
by g i f t but t h e r e m a i n i n g 5 0 % of P h i l l i p s i n v e s t m e n t was 
purchased during the marriage. Defendant, Kathy P h i l l i p s , was 
only awarded one-half of the second 50% of Phillips Investment 
(Mark Phillip's half) which was purchased during their marriage. 
The Opinion is a well reasoned attempt to follow Mortensen, not 
to depart from it. Plaintiff did not prove at trial the stock 
purchased from his brother, Mark Phillips, was owned by plaintiff 
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prior to m a r r i a g e , or that he acquired it by gift or inheritance 
during the m a r r i a g e , or that he had paid for it with gifted or 
inherited funds. Plaintiff argues that cash gifts by his parents 
paid for the insurance premiums of the buy-sell insurance. This 
is an assumption and was not proven at trial. Furthermore, these 
cash gifts were commingled with Phillips Investment funds which 
d e f e n d a n t asserts an equitable claim. The Phillips Investment 
fund which paid the insurance premiums was marital property and 
not the separate property of Scott Phillips as alleged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY SCOTT H. PHILLIPS DURING 
~ ~ ~ MARRIAGE THROUGH A BUY-SELL AGREEMENT IS A PURCHASE 
OF PROPERTY RENDERING IT A MARITAL ASSET 
S c o t t P h i l l i p s d i d not a c q u i r e his b r o t h e r , Mark 
Phillip's half interest in Phillips Investment by means of gift 
or i n h e r i t a n c e . It is an uncontested fact that Mark Phillips 
half i n t e r e s t was pure hased, during the marriage of Scott and 
K a t h r y n P h i l l i p s , by insurance required to be procured by the 
b u y - s e l l a g r e e m e n t e s t a b l i s h e d on J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 8 0 . In the 
P r e a m b l e of the b u y - s e l l a g r e e m e n t , Exhibit 5, the intent of 
Scott and Mark Phillips is stated to be to secure this Agreement 
by the use of life insurance to provide all or a substantial part 
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of the p u r c h a s e p r i c e when needed to carry out this Agreement 
upon the death of a stockholder. 
In p a r a g r a p h 2 of the b u y - s e l l Agreement, Scott and 
Mark Phillips were each required to m a i n t a i n , as p o l i c y o w n e r 
and b e n e f i c i a r y , life i n s u r a n c e on the life of each o t h e r . 
P a r a g r a p h 4 of the A g r e e m e n t r e q u i r e s e a c h s t o c k h o l d e r to 
m a i n t a i n each of the policies in full force and effect for the 
p u r p o s e of the A g r e e m e n t , p a y i n g all p r e m i u m s w h e n due and 
d e l i v e r i n g p r o o f of p a y m e n t to the I n s u r e d . The b u y - s e l l 
agreement, time and again, states the intent and purpose of the 
i n s u r a n c e is to fund and p e r m i t the survivor to purchase the 
d e c e a s e d f s property interests. 
Mark P h i l l i p s ' w i d o w received the sum of $218,000.00 
upon his death in 1984 from the buy-sell i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y and 
t r a n s f e r r e d all r i g h t , t i t l e and interest in the property to 
Scott Phillips. (Tr. at 33) As a result, Mark Phillips' one-
h a l f i n t e r e s t p a s s e d to Scott Phillips by means of a business 
t r a n s a c t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by c o n t r a c t p r i o r to M a r k ' s d e a t h . 
Clearly, Scott Phillips acquired his brother's share in Phillips 
Investment by purchase and not by means of gift or inheritance. 
In W a g n e r v. Wagner, 358 S.E. 2d 406 (Va. App. 1987) 
the c o u r t d e a l t with a s i m i l a r issue of purchase of property 
during marriage resulting in the property being declared marital 
p r o p e r t y . The Virginia Court of Appeals determined the wife's 
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f i v e p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t in a s h o p p i n g c e n t e r to be m a r i t a l 
p r o p e r t y even t h o u g h the w i f e ' s f a t h e r f o r g a v e p a y m e n t of 
p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s p r e p a r e d pursuant to exercise by the wife of 
written options to purchase an interest in the shopping center. 
The Court found that the daughter's signing of the promissory 
notes to her father to acquire interest in the shopping c e n t e r 
was a purchase. 
In Gied inghagan v. Giedinghagen 712 S.W. 2d 711 (Mo. 
Ct. A p p . 1 9 8 6 ) , the court e m p h a s i z e d t h a t p r o p e r t y 
a c q u i r e d ( p u r c h a s e d ) up to the d a t e of legal s e p a r a t i o n or 
dissolution is marital property. Whether the husband r e c e i v e d 
any actual l o t t e r y winnings was not decided, only that a just 
distribution of marital property was required. 
This case is s i m i l a r to the issues presented by the 
Illinois case of In Re Marriage of Agazim, 498 N.E. 2d 742 (111. 
App. 2 Dist. 1 9 8 6 ) . It was determined the wife's interest in an 
a p a r t m e n t c o m p l e x a c q u i r e d d u r i n g the m a r r i a g e was m a r i t a l 
property. A written agreement detailed the terms of sale of four 
b u i l d i n g s from the p l a i n t i f f ' s father to plaintiff, Janice L. 
Agazim and her sister. The s i s t e r s w e r e to pay the m o r t g a g e 
p a y m e n t s on the a p a r t m e n t complex out of the rental proceeds. 
The Illinois Appellate Court determine the complex was purchased 
by plaintiff, and was not a gift, as was originally argued. 
On its second appeal after a judgment of dissolution 
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and property award was entered, the Appellate Court of Illinois 
a f f i r m e d the a p a r t m e n t c o m p l e x was m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , In Re 
Marriage of Agazim, 530 N.E. 2d 1110 (111. App. 2 Dist. 1 9 8 8 ) , 
The a p p e l l a t e court affirmed the award of the parties' entire 
interest in the complex to Janice Agazim stating Janice and her 
s i s t e r w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e for the m o r t g a g e and ruled the trial 
court did not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n in a w a r d i n g the a p a r t m e n t 
c o m p l e x to p l a i n t i f f . The court emphasized that division of 
m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y only need be a just d i s t r i b u t i o n and not 
n e c e s s a r i l y an equal one w h e r e r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s w a r r a n t the 
result. 
M o r t e n s e n v. M o r t e n s e n , supra, holds that Utah trial 
courts should generally award property acquired by one spouse by 
gift or i n h e r i t a n c e during the m a r r i a g e to that spouse. The 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case follows Mortensen as 
it determined that Scott P h i l l i p s o b t a i n e d the first half of 
Phillips Investment by gift from his parents, 
As to the gifting of that portion, the 
finding of the lower court is affirmed. 
The joinder document signed by Mrs. Phillips 
relates only to that stock acquired by him 
before marriage or by gift during marriage 
As to the purchase of Mark Phillips' half interest in 
Phillips Investment upon his death, the Court of A p p e a l s held 
Scott Phillips was a buyer who purchased the stock from a seller 
pursuant to a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t of s a l e . T h u s , the stock is 
marital property acquired by purchase during marriage. 
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POINT TWO: THE FUNDING ARRANGEMENT FOR PAYMENT OF THE 
BUY-SELL INSURANCE DOES NOT ALTER THE 
NATURE OF THE PROPERTY MAKING IT SEPARATE 
PROPERTY OF SCOTT PHILLIPS 
Scott Phillips makes great importance of the fact that 
his p a r e n t s , Hugh and F r a n c i s P h i l l i p s , instigated a gifting 
program so as to fund payment of the life insurance on his life 
and that of his brother, Mark. The argument being a cash gift to 
Scott P h i l l i p s paid the i n s u r a n c e p r e m i u m and t h e r e f o r e the 
property purchased with insurance proceeds should be his sole and 
s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y . Scott Phillips assumes the voluntary cash 
gifts by his parents paid for the insurance premiums. However, 
t h e s e cash g i f t s were d e p o s i t e d , and c o m m i n g l e d with other 
Phillips Investment funds in w h i c h Kathy P h i l l i p s a s s e r t s an 
e q u i t a b l e c l a i m . The P h i l l i p s I n v e s t m e n t funds were not the 
separate property of Scott Phillips as alleged. P r o c e e d s from 
the sale of the home in Jackson Hole, Wyoming were commingled 
with the Phillips Investment funds. 
Some exceptions noted in the main opinion of Mortensen 
include where the other spouse by her efforts has contributed to 
the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of separate property 
or where the property has been c o n s u m e d or its i d e n t i t y lost 
through commingling . 
Kathy Phillips has a legitimate equitable claim on the 
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proceeds from the sale of the home in Jackson Hole, Wyoming which 
were commingled with Phillips Investment funds. When the parties 
moved to Jackson Hole, Wyoming in 1968, they resided in a mobile 
home for two y e a r s . (Tr. at 115) In 1970, they moved into a 
Boise C a s c a d e Home p u r c h a s e d by P h i l l i p s Investment Company. 
( T r . at 115) Kathy P h i l l i p s t e s t i f i e d to her e f f o r t s of 
i m p r o v i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g their h o m e . (Tr. at 116) She 
testified to landscaping the yard, wallpapering, putting drapes 
in the h o m e , and to the fact that she did all the maintenance 
required in the home. (Tr. at 116, 117) 
In Mortensen, supra, the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
that a s p o u s e may a c q u i r e an e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t in separate 
property through her e f f o r t s or e x p e n s e s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property. (Pg. 
308) Kathy Phillips lived in the Jackson Hole residence for nine 
y e a r s and thereby earned an equitable interest in the property 
t h r o u g h her e n h a n c e m e n t , m a i n t e n a n c e and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e 
property . 
When the p a r t i e s moved to P l e a s a n t G r o v e , Utah in 
April, 1979, Phillips I n v e s t m e n t C o m p a n y sold the home for a 
considerable profit. Hugh Phillips testified there was a profit 
of about $55,000.00 made after payment of $20,000.00 in t a x e s , 
and all proceeds were put back into Phillips Investment. (Tr. at 
48) 
It should be noted that Phil 1 I D S Investment Durchased 
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the home and real property when Kathy and Scott Phillips were in 
need of a r e s i d e n c e in J a c k s o n H o l e , W y o m i n g and s o l d t h e 
property in 1979 when the parties moved to Utah as they would not 
be living in it to maintain, protect and enhance its value. 
The p r o c e e d s from sale of the Jackson Hole property 
were commingled with P h i l l i p s I n v e s t m e n t funds and cannot be 
traced to other i n v e s t m e n t s . F r a n c e s Phillips testified the 
sale proceeds of $89,000.00 were commingled with other funds of 
Phillips Investment and could not be traced into other accounts. 
(Tr. at 31) 
O n c e the f u n d s from the sale of the J a c k s o n Hole 
p r o p e r t y w e r e c o m m i n g l e d with the other P h i l l i p s I n v e s t m e n t 
funds, it is impossible to state who is paying for the insurance 
p r e m i u m s . A p p a r e n t l y , Mark P h i l l i p s r e c o g n i z e d that K a t h y 
Phillips had an equitable interest in Phillips Investment 
funds as he, prior to his death, authorized payment out of the 
Phillips Investment "slush fund" of $12,000.00 for down payment 
on Scott and Kathy Phillip's home in Pleasant Grove, Utah (Tr. 
at 67, 70) 
F u r t h e r m o r e as stated in the Opinion of the Court of 
A p p e a l s , the funding a r r a n g e m e n t for p a y m e n t of i n s u r a n c e 
p r e m i u m s does not alter the fact that the property acquired is 
marital property. If Scott Phillips could prove, which defendant 
denies he has, the insurance premiums were paid from his separate 
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f u n d s he m i g h t receive the amount of the premiums but not the 
insurance proceeds. See Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 
1 9 8 2 ) ; Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1 9 7 4 ) . 
M o r e o v e r , e q u i t y requires a fair distribution of the 
a s s e t s of the p a r t i e s a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e . T h e 
o v e r a r c h i n g general rule remains the same in any divorce case: 
to provide adequate support for the children of the marriage and 
to divide the economic assets and income stream of the parties so 
as to permit both to maintain themselves after marriage as nearly 
as p o s s i b l e at t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g e n j o y e d d u r i n g the 
m a r r i a g e . See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Justice Zimmerman and Durham in concurring opinions in 
Mortensen emphasized equity ultimately takes precedence over the 
characterization of whether the property is separate or m a r i t a l , 
Where possible, interests of parties in 
their separate property, such as these 
described by Justice Howe, should be 
honored. For this reason, the rules 
articulated today, like those generally 
applicable to separate pre-marital property, 
may limit somewhat the trial court's initial 
flexibility to allocate property of a 
marriage in a fashion so as to provide an 
entirely equitable portion to each party. 
But if, after an attempt is made to pay due 
deference to each party's claim to particular 
pieces of property by reason of their source, 
the Court finds that it is unable to fashion a 
division of assets and awards of alimony, and 
child support that will be just and equitable 
for both parties and the children, then it is 
free to ignore these claims in the greater 
interest in a just and equitable decree. 
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A c c o r d i n g l y , p l a i n t i f f i s not e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e 83%, 
a lmost $ 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , o f t h e a s s e t s a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e t w e n t y 
( 2 0 ) y e a r m a r r i a g e t o an award o f o n l y 17% to d e f e n d a n t . 
D e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o an e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a l l 
p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d d u r i n g the m a r r i a g e . 
CONCLUSION 
The O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i n t h i s case 
f o l l o w e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s s e t f o r t h i n M o r t e n sen c o n t r a r y t o 
Respondent 's c o n t e n t i o n . Respondent f a i l e d to prove a t t r i a l h i s 
s o l e and s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y p a i d f o r t h e b u y - s e l l i n s u r a n c e 
w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y f u n d e d t h e p u r c h a s e o f h i s b r o t h e r ' s h a l f 
i n t e r e s t i n P h i l l i p s I n v e s t m e n t . D e f e n d a n t , Ka th ryn P h i l l i p s has 
a l e g i t i m a t e e q u i t a b l e c l a i m on t h e f u n d s w h i c h p a i d t h e 
i n s u r a n c e p r e m i u m as she c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e e n h a n c e m e n t , 
m a i n t e n a n c e , and p r o t e c t i o n of t he J a c k s o n H o l e , Wyoming home 
w h i c h s a l e s p r o c e e d s w e r e c o m m i n g l e d w i t h o t h e r P h i l l i p s 
Inves tmen t f u n d s . F u r t h e r m o r e , d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h e f u n d i n g 
a r r a n g e m e n t f o r payment of the l i f e i nsu rance p o l i c y does not 
a l t e r the n a t u r e of the p r o p e r t y from be ing c l a s s i f i e d as m a r i t a l 
p r o p e r t y . E q u i t y r e q u i r e s a d i v i s i o n o f asse ts t h a t w i l l be j u s t 
and p e r m i t bo th p a r t i e s t o m a i n t a i n themse lves a f t e r the mar r i age 
as n e a r l y as p o s s i b l e a t the s tanda rd o f l i v i n g en joyed d u r i n g 
the m a r r i a g e . 
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Accordingly, Respondent's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should 
be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 / ^ d a y of August, 1989. 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
!B€RT L. NE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING U 
I hereby certify on this )J day of August, 1989, I 
mailed four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, postage 
prepaid, to Jane A. M a r q u a r d t , A t t o r n e y for R e s p o n d e n t , 2661 
Washington Blvd., Suite 202, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
iOflERTL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Scott H. Phillips, 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
Kathryn A. Phillips, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F I I P 
MAR 314939 
Utah CtJLrt of Appeals 
RECEIVED APR 0 J 1985 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 870579-CA 
Second District/ Weber County 
The Honorable David E. Roth 
Attorneys: Robert L. Neeley/ Ogden# for Appellant 
Jane A. Marquardt, Ogden, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench/ and Jackson, 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant/ Kathryn Phillips/ seeks reversal or adjustment 
of the property and alimony awarded to her upon divorce. We 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for 
further consideration. 
The precise property issue we must decide is whether 
property acquired during marriage through a buy-sell agreement 
of one spouse is the separate property of that spouse or 
marital property? 
The alimony issue is whether the findings support the 
alimony award as to amount and time limit. 
PROPERTY: SEPARATE OR MARITAL? 
The parties were married October 6, 1967. At the time of 
divorce/ each was forty-five years of age and their two sons 
were nineteen and sixteen. Mrs. Phillips had one year of 
college and one and one-half years of medical technology 
training prior to marriage. She was a homemaker during the 
twenty-year marriage and was unemployed when divorced. Mr. 
Phillips was a career employee with the U.S. Forest Service. 
In January 1967, Scott Phillips' parents organized a 
business corporation which became known as Phillips Investment 
Corporation, Inc. During the 1970's, his parents gifted to him 
and his brother, Mark, 24.5% each of the corporate stock. On 
January 1, 1980, the brothers entered into a "Buy-Sell Stock 
Agreement." Therein each agreed to purchase the stock of the 
other in the event of death or a lifetime sale. The purchase 
price was to be determined on an annual basis by endorsing a 
stock value on a schedule. Each agreed to procure, as policy 
owner and beneficiary, life insurance on the life of the other 
in the amount specified in the schedule. Each was required to 
maintain the policy owned, "paying all premiums when due and 
delivering proof of such premium payment to the insured." If 
the premium was not paid, the other could advance payment and 
would be entitled to reimbursement with interest. Their 
agreement provided that upon death of a stockholder, "the 
surviving stockholder shall purchase all of the decedent's 
stock in the corporation." In the event the value of the stock 
exceeded the insurance proceeds, the balance of the purchase 
price could be paid by delivering a negotiable promissory note 
in that amount payable on terms specified. If life insurance 
coverage exceeded the stock value, "the excess of each policy 
shall be retained by the beneficiary thereof for his own 
benefit." 
In 1982, the brothers acquired the balance of the corporate 
stock from their parents and became equal owners. In 1983, the 
brothers converted the corporation into Phillips Investments, a 
general partnership. At that time, they requested each of 
their wives to sign a document labeled "Joinder of Spouse," and 
each wife obliged on May 12, 1983. That document stated that 
"the stock of [the corporation] was acquired by her husband 
prior to their marriage or by gift during marriage" and is his 
sole and separate property and that "all income and gains from 
such separate property shall be the sole and separate property 
of said husband." (Emphasis added.) 
In 1984, Mark Phillips died, and Scott Phillips purchased 
his brother's 50% share of Phillips Investments for $218,000 
funded by insurance proceeds. Thereafter, Mr. Phillips 
transferred the assets into Phillips Investment Trust. At time 
of trial, the trust was valued at $260,000. The lower court 
entered the following finding of fact: 
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Plaintiff is the owner of assets worth 
approximately $260,000.00 which are now in 
the entity known as Phillips Investment 
Trust. These assets were gifted to 
plaintiff by his parents over a period of 
many years. Neither plaintiff nor 
defendant have done any significant work 
in the business which made up Phillips 
Investments, nor have either of them made 
any contributions to the value of the 
assets in Phillips Investments. The 
assets of Phillips Investments are 
Plaintiffs' separate property and 
defendant has no claim to this property. 
The fact that plaintiff does have the 
resources of Phillips Investments 
available to him is relevant only to his 
ability to pay child support and alimony. 
The conclusions of law state: "The assets of Phillips 
Investment Trust are plaintiff's sole and separate property and 
defendant has no claim thereto." Mrs. Phillips contends that 
the one-half ownership of the partnership-trust acquired from 
Mark Phillips was not "by means of inheritance or gift but as 
the result of a business transaction." Thus, she argues, this 
particular 50% ownership share is marital property, not Mr. 
Phillips' separate property. Mr. Phillips argues in support of 
the above findings. He also argues that, in any event, the 
language of the "Joinder of Spouse" document should be 
dispositive of any claim that this last-acquired 50% share is 
marital property. We do not agree with Mr. Phillips. 
Our initial consideration is whether the stock was acquired 
during marriage. Virtually all of the stock was acquired 
during the twenty-year marriage. The business corporation was 
organized the same year the parties were married. The lower 
court found that 100% of the assets (stock) was gifted to Mr. 
Phillips by his parents. That finding is clearly in error. 
The parties agree that 50% was acquired from Mark Phillips, not 
from the brothers' parents. Further, Mark's 50% was not 
acquired by gift; consideration for the insurance policy was 
paid by Mr. Phillips himself, not by a donor. In any event, 
Mr. Phillips acquired his brother's 50% during the marriage. 
Thus, it was not premarital property. 
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Insofar as the stock purchased from his brother is 
concerned, Mr. Phillips did not show it was owned by him prior 
to marriage, or that he acquired it by gift or inheritance 
during the marriage or with gifted or inherited funds. See 
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). Only his 
first 50% interest was obtained from his parents by gift. As 
to the gifting of that portion/ the finding of the lower court 
is affirmed. The joinder document signed by Mrs. Phillips 
relates only to that stock acquired by him before marriage or 
by gift during marriage. The legality of the document is not 
at issue and we need not consider its validity. Moreover/ it 
only relates to the separately owned stock acquired up to that 
time or to income from that stock (interest or dividends) or 
gain from that stock (appreciation in value). The remainder of 
the stock acquired from his brother by virtue of their buy-sell 
agreement was neither income nor gain from his prior holdings. 
This is not a case like Preston.1 which involved appreciation 
in value of a premarital asset of the husband and property 
inherited by the wife# nor is it like Burke,2 which involved 
appreciation in value of the wife's inherited property.3 
On the other hand/ this is a case like Wagner v. Wagner, 4 
Va. App. 397/ 358 S.E.2d 407/ 409-11 (1987). There, a father 
gave each of his children an option to acquire an interest in a 
shopping center. Each of the children exercised the option and 
delivered promissory notes to their father in payment of the 
purchase price. Later, the father forgave payment of the notes 
as gifts to his children. Thereafter, one of his married 
daughters became involved in a divorce action. She contended 
the entire transaction was a gift and that her shopping center 
ownership was her separate property. The husband contended 
that, when she acquired the interest, she did so with a loan 
from her father. Thus# he argued that the transaction was a 
purchase, not a gift/ and that the forgiving of the note was 
irrelevant. The court agreed that the transaction was a 
T. Preston~v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982K 
2. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). 
3. The trial court and the parties mistakenly characterized 
the property issue as appreciation in value after inheritance 
or gift. Their concern was whether either party had done worl 
or made contributions adding value to the stock gifted by Mr. 
Phillips' parents. 
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purchase on the date it occurred and the character thereof 
could not be altered by later action. 
Here, the Phillips brothers' stock transaction was pursuant 
to an arm's-length buy-sell agreement. The fact that Mr. 
Phillips utilized insurance proceeds from a policy he purchased 
to fund the full purchase price of his brother's stock did not 
change the transaction to one of gift or inheritance. Nor 
would the character of the transaction be other than purchase 
if funded part by insurance proceeds and part by notes, as 
their buy-sell agreement contemplated, or if funded by 
borrowing from a third party, or by some other fortuitous 
event, such as a lottery. The stock was acquired during 
marriage by purchase and is marital property. See In re 
Marriage of Aoazim, 147 111. App. 3d 646, 498 N.E.2d 742 (1986) 
(transfer of apartment building to wife from wife's father was 
sale rather than nonmarital gift, agreement transferring 
buildings was contract of sale); Giedinahaaen v. Giedinohaaen, 
712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (wife's lottery winnings 
were marital property, subject to equitable distribution). 
In summary, Mr. Phillips did not acquire his brother's 
stock prior to marriage. It was not separate as premarital 
property. His brother's share was not received by Mr. Phillips 
from anyone as an heir or devisee. Thus, it was not separate 
as inherited property. The share was not received by Mr. 
Phillips from a donor as donee and was not purchased with funds 
that were gifted to him by a donor. Thus, it was not separate 
as gifted property. Mr. Phillips was a buyer who purchased the 
stock from a seller pursuant to a written contract of sale. 
Thus, the stock is marital property because acquired by 
purchase during marriage. The funding arrangement did not 
alter the nature of the property acquired.4 
The parties requested, as being equitable, an equal 
4. In his brief, Mr. Phillips argues that "the evidence shows 
that plaintiff had received these assets through gifts and 
inheritance from his family.- He did not argue that the 
insurance proceeds were his separate property on any 
rationale. If he had shown that the insurance premiums were 
paid with advances of his separate property, he might have 
recovered the amount thus paid, but not the proceeds of the 
insurance policy. See, e.g., Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 
(Utah 1982) (husband credited with $9,310.93 advanced on 
cabin); Humphreys v. Humphreys. 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) (wife 
reimbursed $3,400 advanced as down payment on family home). 
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distribution of their marital property. The lower court 
honored their requests concerning the property distributed. 
Thus, Mrs. Phillips is entitled to one-fourth of the Phillips 
Investment Trust (one-half of 50%) as valued on the date of 
divorce, together with a pro rata share of income/loss and 
appreciation/depreciation accrued thereon. 
We reverse and remand for a property award consistent with 
this opinion. 
ALIMONY AWARD 
Finally, we turn to the alimony award of $1,000 per month 
for ten years. Mrs. Phillips' principal assertion concerning 
alimony is that the trial court failed to make findings on two 
of the three alimony factors stated in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). We agree with this contention. The 
trial court found that Mr. Phillips had ability to provide 
support from his income of $5,000 per month. There is no 
finding concerning Mrs. Phillips' needs. Her exhibit showed 
monthly living expenses of $1,000. He did not challenge that 
amount. He claims she only asked for $1,000 alimony, but her 
request was made in tandem with a request for $156,584 in 
property distribution. She received only $71,000 in property. 
The court did make the following finding relating to the factor 
of her ability to support herself: 
Defendant has received post high school 
training and earned a certificate in 
medical technology. Defendant has not 
used this certificate in many years and 
has been employed only in a few minor 
jobs; during most of defendant's marriage 
to plaintiff, she has been a full time 
homemaker and not employed outside the 
home. Defendant has basically good 
health, is intelligent, and is capable of 
employment. Defendant has no current 
source of income and is entitled to an 
award of alimony. 
There is no finding concerning her earning capacity, which 
would provide a baseline for modification purposes. See Higley 
v. Higlev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 & n.l (Utah 1983); Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 326-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). We are 
unable to review the adequacy of the findings to support the 
870579-CA 6 
conclusion that "plaintiff should pay to decedent the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month," nor do we see any evidence or finding 
supporting or relevant to the conclusion that alimony should 
continue for a period of only ten years and not be permanent. 
Nothing in the record indicates any particular significance of 
that period of time. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for additional findings 
concerning: (1) Mrs. Phillips* needs;5 (2) her ability to 
provide for herself, including an earning capacity baseline; 
(3) elimination of the ten-year cap on alimony; (4) a separate 
finding concerning income which will flow to both parties from 
the assets awarded them; and (5) an alimony award consistent 
with those findings. See Johnson v. Johnson. 103 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 22 (Ct. App. March 8, 1989). 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
.— , * , i?m • • • ' v - -ZJ2 : 1 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
{/i // /V j xg y 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
5. Mrs. Phillips testified that she needed, in addition to her 
monthly living expenses, income for employment training and 
rehabilitation so she could provide for herself. Apparently, 
she expected to provide for her rehabilitation through income 
from a larger property award, which she did not receive. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS, : Civil No. 98183 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial on October 23, 1987 before the Honorable David E. 
Roth, judge of the above entitled court. Plaintiff was both 
personally present and represented by his attorney Jane A. 
Marquardt. Defendant was present and represented by her 
attorney Robert L. Neeley. Upon hearing sworn testimony 
from the parties and witnesses, and after receiving into 
evidence various written exhibits, and hearing arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, the court 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant maintained a matrimo-
d/ 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No. 98183 
Page 2 
nial domicile in Weber County, State of Utah, and defendant 
was a resident of Weber County for more than three months 
immediately preceding the filing of this divorce complaint. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married on October 6, 1967 in Alta, Utah. Both 
plaintiff and defendant are presently 45 years of age. 
3. Two children have been born as issue of this 
marriage, one of whom is still a minor, to wit: Christopher 
John Phillips, born November 11, 1970. 
4. During the marriage, the parties have experi-
enced various problems and they have now been separated for 
approximately one year and both parties are entitled to be 
granted a decree of divorce on the basis of irreconcilable 
differences. 
5. Plaintiff and defendant agree that defendant 
should be awarded custody of the minor child, subject to 
plaintiff's reasonable rights of visitation. 
6. Plaintiff is a full time employee of the United 
States Forest Service and has received a gross monthly sal-
ary of $3,155.00. He also has the right to receive income 
from Phillips Investment Trust. Over the past five years, 
the amount of income available to plaintiff from Phillips 
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Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No. 98183 
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Investments has averaged $25,000.00 per year and the court 
finds that plaintiff will continue to receive approximately 
this amount of money from Phillips Investments. The court 
finds that plaintiff's income will continue at close to this 
rate despite the fact that the major income of Phillips 
Investments, payments from the Hamilton/Holman promissory 
note, will cease after 1990. The court believes that the 
assets of the trust are worth approximately $260,000.00 and 
will continue to generate at least $21,000.00 per year in 
income to plaintiff. 
7. The court believes it is reasonable to set 
plaintiff's child support and alimony responsibilities on an 
expected total monthly gross income of $5,000.00. This fig-
ure includes $3,155.00 per month from plaintiff's employment 
with the forest service and $1,750.00-$2,083.00 per month 
from Phillips Investments. 
8. Defendant has received post high school train-
ing and earned a certificate in medical technology. 
Defendant has not used this certificate in many years and 
has been employed only in a few minor jobs; during most of 
defendant's marriage to plaintiff, she has been a full time 
homemaker and not employed outside the home. Defendant has 
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basically good health, is intelligent, and is capable of 
employment. Defendant has no current source of income and 
is entitled to an award of alimony. 
9. Defendant is entitled to alimony in the amount 
of $1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and con-
tinuing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death 
of plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, 
or upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever 
event occurs first. 
10. Defendant is entitled to child support in the 
amount of $622.00 per month, the same to be paid until the 
child, Christopher, graduates from high school, assuminq he 
graduates on schedule with his class. 
11. Plaintiff is the owner of assets worth approxi-
mately $260,000.00 which are now in the entity known as the 
Phillips Investments Trust. These assets were gifted to 
plaintiff by his parents over a period of many years. 
Neither plaintiff nor defendant have done any significant 
work in the business which made up Phillips Investments, nor 
have either of them made any contributions to the value of 
the assets in Phillips Investments. The assets of Phillips 
Investments are plaintiff's separate property and defendant 
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has no claim to this property. The fact that plaintiff does 
have the resources of Phillips Investments available to him 
is relevant only to his ability to pay child support and 
alimony. 
12. The parties have accumulated various assets in 
the marriage, valued as follows: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-
h. 
i. 
j . 
k. 
1. 
Equity in Riverdale, Utah home 
Hoback, Wyoming property 
victor Estates 
Plaintiff's retirement 
Plaintiff and defendant IRAs 
Weber Valley Bank savings 
Moore Financial stock 
Ketchum bank account 
1986 Volkswagon automobile 
1981 Honda automobile 
Furniture and household contents in 
defendant's possession 
Furniture, sporting equipment and 
$ 29,000, 
45,000. 
4,500. 
29,000. 
14,528, 
1,600, 
648, 
300, 
6,800. 
2,000, 
6,500, 
1,000, 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
personal effects in plaintiff's poss. 
13. The parties have incurred various debts, 
including a mortgage on the Riverdale home owing to Fleet 
Mortgage in the approximate amount of $47,000.00, a bill 
owing to Sears in the amount of $335.00, and $600.00 owing 
to Rose Bourgeois for money loaned on the Hoback property. 
14. Plaintiff is employed by the United States 
Forest Service and has health insurance coverage through his 
employer. Pursuant to the terms of the federal law known as 
C.O.B.R.A., defendant is eligible to enroll for continued 
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insurance coverage as the ex-spouse of a covered employee, 
14. Each party has retained an attorney to repre-
sent them in this action and has agreed to pay a reasonable 
amount for attorney fees. 
From the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That both parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other party herein, the same to become 
final upon signing by the judge and filing with the clerk of 
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
2. That the sole care, custody and control of the 
parties1 minor child, to-wit: Christopher John Phillips be 
awarded to defendant, subject to reasonable rights of visi-
tation in the plaintiff. 
3* That the plaintiff should pay to the defendant, 
as and for child support, the sum of $622.00 per month, and 
shall make such payments until said child attains majority 
or the child's regular high school class graduates, which-
ever occurs later. 
4. That alimony should be awarded upon the follow-
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No. 98183 
Page 7 
ing terms: plaintiff should pay to defendant the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and continu-
ing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death of 
plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, or 
upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever 
event occurs first, 
5. One-half of plaintiff's monthly child support 
and alimony payment, or $811.00, shall be paid .directly to 
defendant by the 1st day of each month and one-half shall be 
paid directly to defendant bv the 15th day of each month. 
6. That the child support Order should include, as 
a means of collecting child support, a provision for with-
holding income pursuant to Sections 78-45d-l et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant shall alternate claim-
ing the minor child as a dependent on their tax returns with 
plaintiff being entitled to claim him in 1987, defendant in 
19 88, and so on. Plaintiff must be current on his child 
support payments to claim the child as a dependent on his 
tax return. Defendant is required to sign the necessary 
forms with the Internal Revenue Service which indicate that 
plaintiff is entitled to claim the child as a deduction 
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in the appropriate years. 
8. Plaintiff shall assist defendant in enrolling 
for continued health insurance coverage through the 
C.O.B.R.A. regulations and defendant shall be responsible 
for paying the premiums for this coverage. 
9. Plaintiff should continue carrying medical and 
dental insurance on the minor child, providing it remains 
available through his place of employment. Any medical or 
dental bills of the child which are not covered by insurance 
should be split between the parties, with each party having 
the responsibility of paying one-half of any uncovered 
medical or dental costs. 
10. That each party is awarded his or her own per-
sonal property already in their possession. 
11. Plaintiff should be awarded the following items 
of property: 
a. His federal retirement, free of any $ 29,000.00 
claim of the defendant 
b. Furniture, sporting equipment and 1,000.00 
personal effects in plaintiff's poss. 
c. 1986 Volkswagon automobile 6,800.00 
d. Ketchum bank account 3 00.00 
e. Hoback property 45,000.00 
f. Plaintiff's IRA 11,952.00 
TOTAL $ 94,052.00 
12. Defendant is awarded the following items of 
property: 
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a. Riverdale home located at $ 29,000,00 
3985 South 700 West, subject to 
mortgage thereon 
b. Furniture and household contents 6,500.00 
in defendant's possession 
c. 1981 Honda automobile 2,000.00 
d. Defendant's IRA 2,576.00 
e. Weber Valley Bank savings 1,600.00 
f. Moore Financial stock 648.00 
g. Victor Estates 4,500.00 
TOTAL $ 46,824.00 
13. In order to equalize the above property 
distribution, plaintiff shall pay to defendant: 
(a) the sum of $12,000.00 cash, the same to be 
paid within ninety (90) days, or on or before • January 21, 
1988. 
(b) Pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties, plaintiff shall pay to defendant an additional sum 
of $12,000.00 in order to compensate her for plaintiff's 
IRA. This sum shall be paid within two (2) weeks of the 
entry of this Decree of Divorce. 
14. The assets of Phillips Investments Trust are 
plaintiff's sole and separate property and defendant has no 
claim thereon. 
15. Defendant is entitled to all antiques which 
were given to her by her family, free and clear of any claim 
by plaintiff. 
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16. Defendant shall pay the mortgage on the 
Riverdale home to Fleet Mortgage and hold plaintiff harmless 
thereon, together with any other debts or obligations she 
may have in her own name. 
17. Plaintiff shall pay the Sears bill in the 
approximate amount of $3 35.00, the debt owing to Rose 
Bourgeois in the amount of $600.00, together with any other 
debts or obligations he may have in his own name and hold 
defendant harmless thereon. 
18. Plaintiff shall pay to defendant's attorney, 
Robert L. Neeley, the sum of $1,000.00 as partial payment of 
defendant•s attorney fees• 
20. Let Judgment and Decree be entered in accor-
dance herewith. 
DATED this /jf day of //^^IT^ 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
SAV10 ''£. "TROTH ~ > ' 
^-Dis tr ic t Court Judae 
?ERT L. N E E L E Y ~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
n/ 
NDVH 
JANE A. MARQUARDT 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 2085 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT-OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 9818 3 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial on October 23, 1987 before the Honorable David E. 
Roth, judge of the above entitled court. Plaintiff was both 
personally present and represented by his attorney Jane A. 
Marquardt. Defendant was present and represented by her 
attorney Robert L. Neeley. Upon hearing sworn testimony 
from the parties and witnesses, after receiving into evi-
dence various written exhibits, hearing arguments of 
counsel, being fully advised in the matter, and having 
already made and entered, separately and in writing, its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having therein 
directed entry of Judgment and Decree in accordance 
Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No. 98183 
Page 2 
"
corded
 " g & V 
indexed 
therewith. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. That both parties are awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other party herein, the same to become 
final upon signing by the judge and filing with the clerk of 
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
2. That the sole care, custody and control of the 
parties' minor child, to-wit: Christopher John Phillips, be 
awarded to defendant, subject to reasonable rights of visi-
tation in the plaintiff. 
3. That the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant, 
as and for child support, the sum of $622.00 per month, and 
shall make such payments until said child attains majority 
or the child's regular high school class graduates, which-
ever occurs later. 
4. That alimony is awarded upon the following 
terms: plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and continu-
ing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death of 
plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, or 
Recorded Book! 4 1 
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upon defendants cohabitation with another man, whichever 
event occurs first. 
5- One half of plaintiff's monthly child support 
and alimony payment, or $811.00, shall be paid directly to 
defendant by the 1st day of each month and one-half shall be 
paid directly to defendant by the 15th day of each month. 
6. That the child support Order shall include, as 
a means of collecting child support, a provision for with-
holding income pursuant to Sections 78-45d-l et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant shall alternate claim-
ing the minor child as a dependent on their tax returns with 
plaintiff being entitled to claim him in 1987, defendant in 
1988, and so on. Plaintiff must be current on his child 
support payments to claim the child as a dependent on his 
tax return. Defendant is required to sign the necessary 
forms with the Internal Revenue Service which indicate that 
plaintiff is entitled to claim the child as a deduction 
in the appropriate years. 
8. Plaintiff shall assist defendant in enrolling 
for continued health insurance coverage through the 
C.O.B.R.A. regulations and defendant shall be responsible 
Recorded Bockl 4 I 
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for paying the premiums for this coverage. 
9. Plaintiff shall continue carrying medical and 
dental insurance on the minor child, providing it remains 
available through his place of employment. Any medical or 
dental bills of the child which are not covered by insurance 
shall be split between the parties, with each party having 
the responsibility of paying one-half of any uncovered medi-
cal or dental costs. 
10. That each party is awarded his or her own per-
sonal property already in their possession. 
11. Plaintiff is awarded the following items of 
property: 
a. His federal retirement, free of any $ 29,000.00 
claim of the defendant 
b. Furniture, sporting equipment and 1,000.00 
personal effects in plaintiff's poss. 
c. 1986 Volkswagon automobile 6,800.00 
d. Ketchum bank account 300.00 
e. Hoback property 45,000.00 
f. Plaintiff's IRA 11,952.00 
TOTAL $ 94,052.00 
12. Defendant is awarded the following items of 
property: 
a. Riverdale home located at $ 29,000.00 
3985 South 700 West, subject to 
mortgage thereon 
b. Furniture and household contents 6,500.00 
in defendant's possession 
c. 1981 Honda automobile 2,000.00 
d. Defendant's IRA 2,576.00 
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e . Weber Val ley Bank savings 
f. Moore F i n a n c i a l s tock 
g. Vic tor E s t a t e s 
1,600-00 
648.00 
4,500.00 
TOTAL $ 46,824.00 
13. In order to equalize the above property 
distribution, plaintiff shall pay to defendant: 
(a) the sum of $12,000.00 cash, the same to be 
paid within ninety (90) days, or on or before January 21, 
1988. 
(b) an additional sum of $12,000.00 in order 
to compensate her for plaintiff's IRA, the same to be paid 
within two (2) weeks of the entry of this Decree of Divorce. 
14. The assets of Phillips Investments Trust are 
plaintiff's sole and separate property and defendant has no 
claim thereon. 
15. Defendant is entitled to all antiques which 
were given to her by her family, free and clear of any claim 
by plaintiff. 
16. Defendant shall pay the mortgage on the 
Riverdale home to Fleet Mortgage and hold plaintiff harmless 
thereon, together with any other debts or obligations she 
may have in her own name. 
17. Plaintiff shall pay the Sears bill in the 
Phillips v. Phillips 
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approximate amount of $3 35.00, the debt owing to Rose 
Bourgeois in the amount of $600.00, together with any other 
debts or obligations he may have in his own name and hold 
defendant harmless thereon. 
18. Plaintiff shall pay to defendant's attorney, 
Robert L. Neeley, the sum of $1,000.00 as partial payment of 
defendant's attorney fees. 
19. That each of the parties shall execute and 
deliver to the other party any deeds, stock certificates, 
insurance policies, assignments, and any other documents or 
instruments as may be necessary to release the claim of the 
other in their respective real and personal properties as 
now held in the possession of each of the parties. Each 
party has entered his or her appearance before this Court 
and this Court hereby assumes continuing jurisdiction and 
authority to enter such Orders as may be necessary or appro-
priate to accomplish the purposes of tljis paragraph. 
DATED this /<P day of ^/QJ/^^^ 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
E i ROTH ' 
District Court Judge 
)BERT L. NEELEY 
:orney for Defendant 
BUY-SELL STOCK AGREEMENT 
THIS BUY-SELL STOCK AGREEMENT (hereinafter "Agree-
ment"), made and entered into this / day of TTAtJ u A*. ' (3)y$ 
19^', by and between MARK H. PHILLIPS of Boise, Idaho, and 
SCOTT H. PHILLIPS of Pleasant Grove, Utah (hereinafter "Stock-
holders") ; WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the Stockholders own the following number 
of shares of capital stock in PHILLIPS INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
an Idaho corporation (hereinafter "Corporation"): 
Mark H. Phillips 131 Shares 
Scott H. Phillips 131 Shares 
WHEREAS, Each Stockholder wishes to make all of 
said stock and all future acquired stock of the Corporation, 
subject to the terms of this Agreement; and 
WHEREAS, the Stockholders, for their mutual pro-
tection and the more harmonious and successful management 
of the Corporation, wish to provide for the purchase and 
sale of a Stockholder's stock in the event of his death or 
in the event of a sale of any stock in the Corporation by 
a Stockholder during his lifetime; and 
WHEREAS, it is the intent of the Stockholders to 
secure this Agreement by the use of life insurance to pro-
vide all or a substantial part of the purchase price when 
needed to carry out this Agreement upon the death of a 
Stockholder. 
NOW, THEREFORE, In consideration of the mutual 
covenants to buy and sell and the performance thereof ex-
pressed herein by the parties, each of the Stockholders 
does hereby bind himself, his heirs, executors, admini-
strators and assigns, and hereto agrees as follows: 
PHILLIPS THVES-T^E^T 
Two flccowrs- *+l3-0l(?lb * 4-/^ 07t<l!> 
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1. Stock Certificates, Upon the execution of this 
Agreement, the certificates of stock subject hereto shall be 
surrendered to the Corporation as soon as practicable and 
the following legend shall be conspicuously endorsed thereon: 
"Sale, transfer or hypothecation of the 
stock represented by this Certificate is 
restricted by the provisions of a Buy-Sell 
Stock Agreement among the Stockholders, 
dated the / day of jnu^A(i</ 19_£v, Q**P 
a copy of which may be inspected at the /t 
principal office of the Corporation and ^ 
all the provisions of which are incorpor-
ated by reference in this Certificate." 
A copy of this Agreement shall be delivered to the Secretary 
of the Corporation and may be shown to any person making 
inquiry about the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
2. Insurance Policies. Each Stockholder shall 
procure, as policy owner and beneficiary, life insurance 
on the life of each other Stockholder in the amounts speci-
fied in Schedule "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
All policies pertaining to this Agreement shall also be listed 
on Schedule "A" attached hereto. 
3. Additional Insurance Policies. To secure per-
formance of this Agreement, each Stockholder shall be em-
powered to purchase, from time to time, additional insurance 
on the life of the other party to this Agreement, and he 
shall possess the same rights with regard to these new 
policies as exist with respect to previously issued policies. 
Additional purchases of insurance shall be listed on Schedule 
"A" attached hereto. 
4. Payment of Premiums. Each Stockholder shall 
maintain each of the above policies which he owns in full 
force and effect for the purpose of this Agreement, paying 
all premiums when due and delivering proof of such premium 
payment to the Insured(s). If a premium is not paid within 
fifteen (15) days after its due date, the Insured may make 
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the payment, which shall be considered a loan, and in which 
event he shall be reimbursed by the policy owner, together, 
with interest at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum 
from the date of payment. The insurance company issuing 
said policies is authorized to release to the insured any 
information pertaining to the policy or policies insuring 
his life. 
5. Encumbrance of Policies. No party to this 
Agreement shall execute any loans against, impair, or in 
any manner encumber any of the above policies to the detri-
ment of this Agreement without the written consent of the 
other party hereto, except that each policy owner may exer-
cise any dividend options or dividend rights provided by 
the policy without obtaining the consent of the other party 
to this Agreement. 
6. Purchase of Decedent's Stock. Upon th§ death 
of a Stockholder, the surviving Stockholder shall, within 
sixty (60) days after the appointment of a Personal Repre-
sentative of the decedent's estate, proceed to purchase the 
decedent's stock for the value determined in Paragraph 9. 
The surviving Stockholder shall purchase all of the decedent's 
stock in the Corporation. It is the intent of the Stock-
ho
^®3Ls—febat the proceeds -of the life insurance policies 
pertaining to this Agreement shall be used to complete the 
purchase of a decedent's stock. 
In the event the value of a decedent's stock ex-
ceeds the proceeds of the life insurance so carried on his 
life, the surviving Stockholder shall have the privilege 
of paying the excess either in one sum or by executing and 
delivering a negotiable promissory note in the amount of 
the balance. Such note shall be payable in ten (10) equal 
semi-annual installments, the first of which shall be pay-
able to the decedent's legal representative, or his desig-
nated party, six (6) months after the death of the Stock-
holder, together with interest at the rate of ten per cent 
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{iu%; per annum on tne unpaid oaiance. Tne note shall 
provide that the purchaser shall have the right to pay 
any or all installments prior to the actual due date with-
out penalty. 
In the event the value of a decedent's stock is 
less than the proceeds of the life insurance policies insur-
ing his life and pertaining to this Agreement, the excess 
of each policy shall be retained by the beneficiary thereof 
for his own benefit. 
7. Restriction on Transfer Upon Death of Spouse. 
In the event of the death of a spouse of a Stockholder, 
which spouse is not a shareholder of record of the Corpor-
ation, her interest (if any) in the stock of the Corporation 
may be transferred only to her respective spouse, if he 
survives her; provided that in the event of simultaneous 
death, or death in a common disaster, or in the event the 
Stockholder and his spouse die within 120 hours of each 
other, the decedent's interests in and to the stock of the 
Corporation shall be subject to the provisions of the fore-
going Paragraph 6 obligating the other Stockholder to pur-
chase all such shares in the event of the death of a Stockholder. 
8. Transfer of Decedent's Interest. Upon receipt 
of the purchase price in cash and/or a note for any unpaid 
balance thereof, as provided in this Agreement, the legal 
representative of a deceased Stockholder shall transfer the 
decedent's stock to the surviving Stockholder in accordance 
with Paragraph 6. The surviving Stockholder shall pledge 
all of the decedent's stock as security for the unpaid 
balance of the note but shall have the privilege of exer-
cising all rights of ownership in such stock, including 
voting rights, so long as he is not in default under the 
note provided for in Paragraph 6 hereof. 
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9. Value of Stock. The present value of the 
stock, as determined by the Stockholders is S /5 ij . 7 / (j*t) 
per share. At the end of each calendar year, or within ^ 
thirty (30) days thereafter, the Stockholders shall redeter-
mine the value of the stock and said value shall be endorsed 
on Schedule "B" attached hereto and shall be signed by and 
binding on all the parties to this Agreement. The endorse-
ment shall be in the following form: 
"The value of the stock of the Phillips Invest-^-^ 
ment Company for the calendar year 19 £o K^/ a^/? 
for the purpose of the Buy-Sell Stock Agree- x-> ^ z 
ment dated (h , 19^ -c, shall be 04-^ rf^/? 
$ /sVLr 7/ per share." — Q±J " / 
fff^ 
If a redetermination has not been endorsed on Schedule "Bn 
for a particular calendar year, the last determined value 
shall prevail for purposes of this Agreement. 
10. Restriction on Voluntary Transfer. No Stock-
holder shall transfer or encumber his shares of the Corpor-
ation, or any portion thereof, without the written consent 
of the other Stockholder, unless the Stockholder desiring to 
make the transfer or encumbrance (hereinafter the "Transferor") 
shall have first made the offer to sell hereinafter described 
and such offer shall not have been accepted. 
(a) Offer by Transferor. The offer shall be 
given to the other Stockholder and shall consist 
of an offer to sell all of the shares of the 
Corporation owned by the Transferor, to which 
shall be attached a statement of intent to transfer 
or encumber, as the case may be, the name and 
address of such prospective outside purchaser or 
lienor, the number of shares involyed in the 
proposed transfer or encumbrance, and the terms of 
such transfer or encumbrance. 
(b) Acceptance of Offer. Within sixty (60) 
days after the receipt of such offer, the other 
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Stockholder (the "purchaser") may, at his option, 
elect to purchase all, but not less than all, of 
the shares of the Corporation owned by the Trans-
feror. The purchaser shall exercise his election 
to purchase by giving notice thereof to the Trans-
feror, which notice shall specify a date for the 
closing of the purchase which shall be not more 
than thirty (30) days after the date of giving of 
such notice. 
(c) Purchase Price. The purchase price 
for the shares of the Corporation owned by the 
Transferor shall be as set forth in Paragraph 9 
hereof. 
(d) Closing of Purchase. The closing shall 
take place at the principal office of the Corpor-
ation, unless otherwise agreed by the Transferor 
and the purchaser. At the closing, the purchaser 
shall pay to the Transferor ten per cent (10%) 
of the purchase price, and said purchaser shall 
deliver to the Transferor a promissory note pro-
viding for the payment of said remaining balance 
over ten (10) years, plus interest thereon, in 
monthly installments on an amortized basis, the 
first monthly payment being due one month from 
the date of closing. The interest rate stated 
in said promissory note shall be the prime rate of 
interest being quoted on the date of closing by 
Idaho First National Bank, Boise, Idaho. Said note 
shall provide that the makers shall have the privilege 
of prepaying all or any part thereof at any time 
after the year of sale with interest to the date 
of prepayment and without penalty. 
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(e) Release from Restriction. If the offer 
to sell is not accepted by the other Stockholder, 
the Transferor may make a bona fide transfer or 
encumbrance to the prospective outside purchaser 
or lienor named in the statement attached to the 
offer, such sale or encumbrance to be made only 
in strict accordance with the terms therein stated 
and not for an amount less than that determined by 
this Agreement without first offering it to the 
other Stockholder at such lesser price and allow-
ing him fifteen (15) days to decide on purchasing 
the stock at such lesser sum. However, if the 
Transferor shall fail to make such transfer or 
encumbrance within thirty (30) days following the 
expiration of the time hereinabove provided for 
the election by the other Stockholder, such shares 
shall again become subject to all the restrictions 
of this Agreement. 
11. Purchase of Policy by Insured. Upon the death 
of a Stockholder, each surviving Stockholder shall have the 
right to purchase, within sixty (60) days after the qualifi-
cation of the Personal Representative of the estate of the 
deceased Stockholder, all contracts of insurance of his life 
pertaining to this Agreement and which were owned by the 
decedent. 
In the event a Stockholder sells all his stock 
during his lifetime, he shall have the right to purchase, with-
in sixty (60) days thereafter all contracts of insurance on 
his life pertaining to this Agreement; further, each of the 
other Stockholders shall have the right to purchase, within 
the same time, all contracts of insurance on his life per-
taining to this Agreement and which were owned by the selling 
Stockholder. 
Upon termination of this Agreement for any reason, 
each Stockholder shall have the right to purchase, within 
thirty (30) days thereafter,•all contracts of insurance on 
his life pertaining to this Agreement. 
In all of the above events, the purchase price for 
each policy shall be the interpolated terminal reserve as of 
the date of death which covers the period extending beyond 
that date. In the event any permanent form policy to be 
transferred to a surviving Stockholder shall not have been 
in force for a period sufficient to obtain a value as stated 
above, then the purchase price shall be an amount equal to all 
net premiums paid. If the right to purchase said policy or 
policies is not exercised, the policy owner shall have the 
privilege of holding or disposing of said policy or policies 
at his discretion. 
12. Specific Performance. The parties hereby de-
clare that it is impossible to measure in money the damages 
which will accrue to a party hereto or to the Personal Repre-
sentatives of a decedent by reason of a failure to perform 
any of the obligations under this Agreement. Therefore, if 
any party hereto or the Personal Representative of a dece-
dent shall institute any action or proceeding to enforce the 
provisions hereof, any person (including the Corporation) 
against whom such action or proceeding is brought hereby 
waives the claim or defense therein that such party or such 
Personal Representative has an adequate remedy at law, and 
such person shall not urge in any such action or proceeding 
the claim or defense that such remedy at law exists. 
13. Notices. Any and all notices, designations, 
consents, offers, acceptances or any other communication 
provided for herein, shall be given in writing by registered 
or certified mail, which shall be addressed, in the case 
of the Stockholders, to their addresses appearing on the 
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books of the Corporation. For the purposes of this Agree-
ment, a notice served by mail shall be deemed to have been 
delivered on the date mailed, as indicated by the postmark 
on the certified mail receipt, or upon the envelope containing 
the notice. 
14. Severability. The invalidity or unenforce-
ability of any particular provision of this Agreement shall 
not affect the other provisions hereof, and the Agreement 
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid or 
unenforceable provisions were omitted. 
15. Common Disaster. The provisions of this 
Agreement shall be of no effect if both Stockholders die 
within sixty (60) days of each other. 
16. Attorneys1 Fees. If one of the parties hereto 
defaults in any manner or fails to fulfill any and all pro-
visions of this Agreement, and if the non-defaulting party 
places this Agreement with an attorney to exercise any of 
the rights of the defaulting party upon such default or fail-
ure, or if suit be instituted or defended by the non-defaulting 
party by reason of, under or pertaining to such default or 
failure, then the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses from 
the defaulting party. 
17. Prior Agreements. This Agreement supersedes 
all prior agreements between the parties hereto, whether in 
writing or otherwise, and any such prior agreement shall have 
no force or effect upon and after the date of execution of 
this Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agree-
ment of the parties; and no representations, inducements, 
promises or agreements, oral or otherwise, not embodied 
herein, shall be or any force or effect, except to the 
extent that the same are contained herein. 
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18. Supplemental Instruments. The parties hereto, 
for themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors and assigns, agree to execute any and all instruments 
hecessary to carry out the terms of this Agreement. 
• 19. Modification. No change or modification 
of this Agreement shall be valid unless the same is in writ-
ing and signed by all the parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto 
set their hands the day and year in this Agreement first above 
written. 
^ //'/// J//¥ ' 
Mark H. Phillips \j 
3<c#t&' i i i f •' 
Scott H. Phillips 
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STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this fr/S 3ay of 
the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
19 v*, before me, 
5r said State, personally 
appeared MARK H. PHILLIPS, known by me to be the person whose 
name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed my official seal the day and year in this certificate 
first above written. 
zr/sf Notary Public in and for the State 
of Idaho, Residing at Boise, Idaho 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of 
On this day of 19 before me, 
the undersigned, a. Notary Public in and for said State, per-
sonally appeared SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, known by me to be the per-
son whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed my official seal the day and year in this certifi-
cate first above written. 
Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, Residing at 
RUV-Q-TT STOCK AGREEMENT, P. 11 
